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Human Security: A Country Paper on Pakistan

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The paper contrasts the concept of human security from the mainstream notions of security. It also maps the relationship of human security with other sectoral security including economic, political and environmental security. In the process of laying out political economy of human security, it discusses the tensions between the security of citizens and the security of state.

Introduction

Conventionally, security is defined in terms of security of a nation-state in the modern state system. It essentially focuses on territorial security. The whole discourse of security revolves around "security of borders" and other socio-political, economic and environmental concerns figure *only* in their relationship to territorial security. Such a conventional view is inherently flawed due to its monolithic focus on territoriality. Territoriality dictates a vision of security based on monopoly of instruments of coercion and violence. It translates into acquisition of conventional and nuclear weapons and large standing armies. Such security can be realized by making perceived belligerents insecure through muscle flexing.

An important critique of this conventional view was offered by posing the question of "whose security?" In other words, if we transcend the territoriality and take into account security of a living entity, we still need to qualify *who* needs to be made secure. An alternative vision is to shift the focus from territory to people and argue that people and particularly the marginalized groups – people living below subsistence level, women, minorities, need to be made secure against hunger, shelterlessness, illiteracy, unemployment and socio-political discrimination. The question of "whose security" shatters the linear state-centric approach to security and introduces the concept of human security.

This criticism has generated a debate and a number of issues related to refugees, women, terrorism, linkages between external and internal state policies amongst others are being discussed as *non-traditional* or *soft* security issues. Now there is more willingness to discuss security issues in a broader framework.

Human Security: Theoretical Background

While, the concept of human development is certainly universal, it needs to be interpreted in the context of political institutions and the state is one of the most important political institutions.

We can trace evolution of the concept of univarsalist¹ human security in "contractarian" thinking of the Enlightenment period. John Locke's social contract in *the Second Treatise* of Government and similar ideas of Rousseau shifted the theoretical premise of sovereignty from King to a potential citizen (or group of citizens). People willfully give away certain rights to the state in exchange for state protection to ensure property rights, contracts and safety of lives. The French Revolution and the rebellion of colonies in North America against the Great Britain in the 17th century politically instituted governments based on the ideals of contractarianism.² The treaty of Westphalia was followed by the creation of modern nation-states in the West in the 18th and 19th centuries.

However, the birth of modern nation-state system did not imbibe the contractarian spirit of the Enlightenment period. The modern nation state was occupied with the agenda of securing territorial boundaries, achieving economic development and promoting national cohesion by both coercive and non-coercive means. The economic inertia of the technological revolution of the late 19th century busted in the massive conflicts of early

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¹The paper tries to qualify human security with the universality because human security has always been a concern for human beings throughout their existence on this planet. However, in pre-industrialized societies and kingdoms, human security was discussed in the context of particular kingdoms, religious affinity, communities, ethnicities, tribes and clans. While we retain our primary and "primordial" identities and they have a huge impact on the process of policy –making even in today's world, human security is discussed more in terms of a secular and universal idea.

² Although, only white male member of the society was treated as an individual in the context of the rebellion of colonies against the Great Britain at the cost of exclusion of Native Americans, slaves and women. Even in the case the French Revolution, the declaration entitled "The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen".

20th century. There was no mediator at the world level to prevent the outbreak of international conflicts. In post-war period, civil rights and anti-war movements brought forward concerns related to human security in the mainstream thinking in industrialized countries. Post-war era also led to a wave of desalinization across Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Post-colonial states went through (and are still going through) the motions of state formation. While the institutionalization of nation-state in the West followed a rather organic pattern of synchronization of techno-economic progress with the development of socio-political institutions. That was not so in the case of post-colonial states. The organic development inertia of pre-colonized societies was viccisected by the colonization process. The post-colonial states imposed straitjacket of modern nation-state on people who essentially associated themselves with multiple and diverse ethnicities, geographies and politico-economic structures. Instead of harmonization, imposition of post-colonial state led to disjuncture in socio-political institutions and in people's lives.

The dominant groups and classes are believed to take over in post-colonial states and tailor state's policies to suit their vested interests. The interest of these classes becomes the "national interest". Hamza Alavi in his seminal work on "State and Class under Peripheral Imperialism" broadens this view.³ He calls post-colonial states as "peripheral capitalist states".⁴ Instead of the dominance of the "whole" bourgeoisie as spelled out in the Marxist theory, there are more than one dominant classes in peripheral capitalist states: "not only the indigenous bourgeoisie, but also the metropolitan bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie". He thinks that peripheral capitalist states can potentially offer some opportunity for other classes to accrue limited benefits. We will examine this claim in the case of Pakistan later in this paper.⁵

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³ Hamza Alavi, "State and Class Under Peripheral Capitalism", in Hamza Alavi and Theodor Shanin (eds.) *Sociology of "Developing Societies"*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982.

⁴ While the main objective of modern nation-state is ensure the necessary pre-requisites of capitalist social order.

⁵ Ibid.

Human Development/Human Security Debate

The paper makes an attempt to trace the concept of univarsalist human security along the development of modern nation-state and post-colonial state structures to grapple with the concept of human security and human development. Mahbub-ul-Haq has contrasted human security with national security in the following way:⁶

- Security of people, not security of territory;
- Security of individuals, not just of nations;
- Security through development, not through arms;
- Security of all people everywhere in their homes, on their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, and in their environment.

The large body of recent literature on human development has attempted to both globalize and ostracize it. Emphasis on human development belongs to post Cold war era. Human development indices published by the annual UNDP's Human Development Reports are country-specific and offer a commendable commentary on the state of human development or underdevelopment of listed countries. The more recent annual World Development Reports by the World Bank also deliberate over the question of human development in detail. However, the conceptual content of these similar sounding reports and set of recommendations seem to depoliticize the process of development. At the cost of making an oversimplified statement, one can say that in these reports development somehow comes across as a managerial act rather than a socio-political process. Yet, one also needs to recognize and give credit to enormous efforts that has gone into bringing out these annual reports since 1990 since they have proved useful and have brought human development in the global political agenda.

While using the relevant data from Human Development Reports, the paper tries to root the concept of human development in the historicity and politics of the state and links it to the concept of human security. The concept of human security is inherently more political than the concept of human development. Security is a commodity provided by

⁶ Human Development Report for South Asia, 1997, (New York: Oxford University press), 1997, p.84.

the modern nation-state and if human beings or citizens are not feeling secure, the spotlight gets focused on the role of state.

However, the paper does not treat the concept of human security and human development as binary constructs. They are different ways of looking at the dignity of human life along the same continuum. Human development is part of human security. Human security encompasses socio-political and economic human needs and rights to develop. Human development deals with building or facilitating the capability and potential of people to develop. Human security takes into account people's right to make decisions about their lives at the individual and collective political levels, ability to make policies about an equitable distribution of resources and opportunities to develop and secure socio-politico-economic safety and rights.

Amartya Sen has compared the concepts of human rights and human development in an exclusive chapter in the Human Development Report 2000 of UNDP.⁷ He looks at human development and human rights in terms of capabilities and freedoms. He thinks that normative thinking on human development and human rights is "compatible and congruous". Human development deals with "progress of human lives and well-being", "enhancing certain capabilities" and substantial freedoms to be "able to live as we would like and even the opportunity to choose our own fate." Human rights literature focuses on "political liberties, civil rights and democratic freedoms". However, these rights were not made part of Human Development Index (HDI) because it is difficult to "quantify" them. Human rights literature also deals with "rights to education, to adequate health care and to other freedoms that have received systematic investigation in Human Development Reports." Human rights deal with "individual entitlements" and it is complemented by human development's approach of moving towards "an enabling environment in which people's capabilities can be enhanced and their range of choices expanded." Human development also adds the element of "institutional complementarity and resource constraints and the need for public action to address them".

⁷ Human Development Report 2000, United Nations Development Programme, (New York: Oxford University Press), 2000.

⁸ Ibid, pp. 19-26.

However, we disagree with Amartya Sen on "institutional complementarity" in human development literature. Lack of analysis on institutional dimension of human development literature leaves it with relatively poor focus. It will be appropriate to introduce the concept of human security and social justice. It is not the "resource constraint" that hampers possibilities of human development, it is the policy formulation and (often people-insensitive) policy making of dominant classes and groups that has contributed to human underdevelopment in post-colonial countries. Similarly, political rights, civil liberties, protection from the undue state prosecution, due process of law, political empowerment in the realm of human rights cannot be secured unless there is political will to do so. The crucial point of reference is where do ordinary people come in the policy-making process? How much do they participate in the process of policyformulation? Who are the dominant groups and classes whose voice is heard in the decision-making processes? Which classes, groups and genders are marginalized from this exercise? How do different groups and classes negotiate their space, interests and development potentials? Who if any speaks on the behalf of people who have no voice and margin in the decision-making processes?

In a way, all three concepts of human security, human development and human rights do not dig deep in the processes that can transform the ideals of capabilities; freedoms and rights into a meaningful and relatively just development through political participation. Following a contractarian approach, these concepts are normative and progressive extensions of "social contract" oriented political philosophy. However, the question is how to change them? People are born with certain inalienable rights to be secured and developed, however who is going to ensure those rights?

Human security and policy/opinion makers

We need to define the context in which we are discussing policy makers of Pakistan. Governments change. Even the nature of regime changes from military to civilian and then back to military. However, policy makers do not change with the change of every government. Military and civilian bureaucracy pretty much constitutes the oligarchy of policy making in Pakistan. It has been doing so since the creation of Pakistan. Politicians, industrialists, professional classes also play a role. The nature of military and civilian

bureaucracy and influence of other classes and groups has changed. However, bureaucracy has been a constant factor in policy formulation. The process of policy making is as crucial to understand as the policies themselves. In other words, we need to analyze policies in the context of groups and classes who are residual claimants for those policies.

Pakistan can be studied as an archetype of post-colonial countries grappling with the issues of national security. Pakistan can be termed as a "national security state". It has all through its history suffered from what is called "the minority complex". It is a state perceived to be under perpetual external and internal threat. Carved out as a country on overt ideological basis, it never enjoyed good relations with its bigger eastern neighbour-India. It is also termed as the "trauma of birth". Distribution of assets, disputed borders and mutual mistrust and hostility has besieged the collective unconscious of Pakistan's policy formulation. Pakistan's policy has been Indo-centric. No other concern shaped Pakistan's state and society as much as it's relations with India. It turned it into a country obsessed with national security. Dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 further heightened the territorial insecurities of Pakistani state.

Therefore, policy-making discourse is laden with "national security" and "national interest" agenda. However, the crucial question from the perspective of human security is who defines what is national security or national interest? In the context of Pakistan, military and civilian gave meaning to "national security". Pakistan's foreign policy has dominated the agenda of Pakistani state policy formulation. Vigorous pursuit of national security agenda has led the dialectical nature of state: Pakistani state is both "overdeveloped" and "under-developed". On the basis of colonial legacy, the coercive "organs" of state i.e. military, intelligence agencies, para-military troops are over-developed. Civilian bureaucracy is also overdeveloped, though it does not directly form the part of coercive "organs". Coercive military and para-military troops and civilian bureaucracy forms part of over-developed state. However, the abnormal growth of these

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reference, see http://www.pak.gov.pk.

⁹ Hamza Alavi, ibid.

See also Mustapha Kamal Pasha, "Savage Capitalism and Civil Society in Pakistan", in Anita M. Weiss and S. Zulfiqar Gilani (eds) *Power and Civil Society in Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University press), 2001. ¹⁰ Official website of the government of Pakistan defines its various constituent parts as "organs". For

"organs" did not nurture the growth of political culture, political institutions and a healthy civil society. The "overdeveloped" nature of state has directly contributed to the "underdevelopment" of state as well. In other words, dominance of a few classes and groups has contributed to the making of a weak state in a dialectical manner. Hence, national security has been defined as territorial security. Any (perceived) internal dissent by small vocal groups was suppressed by coercive means¹¹. Large-scale industrialization and an increase in per capita income were considered the necessary prerequisites to achieve sound economic development.¹²

However, it does not mean that the military and civilian bureaucracy is the only dominant group in the policy formulation matrix of Pakistan. Big landowners have been part of both elected representatives and military and civilian bureaucracy. Industrialists have also been quite prominent in policy formulation since 1960s. Religious groups, ethnic/sectarian parties, professional/salaried class, small traders and services industry, middle level farmers have nuisance value in Pakistani politics since most of these groups have the street power in urban and semi-urban areas. Hamza Alavi's thesis about the dominance of more than one "indigenous bourgeoisie" in post-colonial states is applicable in the case of Pakistan. Though military and civilian bureaucracy and political process by big landowners drive the decision-making process. Yet, one cannot neglect the influence of industrialists, small traders, professional classes, religious parties and other groups.

According to a study conducted on national and provincial elections in Punjab from 1970 to 1997 shows that land-owning class has maintained its hold over legislative bodies. Big landowners have more or less got 50% seats in assemblies. The business class got actively involved in national politics since 1985 elections. The business class got 6% seats in the National Assembly in 1970 and its share went up one-fifth of total seats in

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¹¹ Pakistani state has often used its military and para-military troops against its own population to curb internal dissent. Publications of the Progressive Papers Limited were seized in 1950s and progressive writers were arrested and put in jail intermittently in 1950s and 1960s. Yahya Khan sent military to fight an insurgency in Bangladesh in late 1960s that led to dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 after Pakistan Army was defeated by India. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto used the military to suppress the nationalistic uprisings in Balochistan and the NWFP in 1970s. The police, para-military and military in early 1980s, quashed the movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). The government of Benazir Bhutto used the similar forces to fight off the violent wing of an ethic party – Mohajir Qaumi Movement in mid 1990s.

¹² Human Development Report 1997, ibid.

1997 election. Rise of business people in electoral representation has been achieved at the cost of decrease in the representation of professionals, middle class and farmers. Their share in the National Assembly declined from 32% in 1970 to 13 % in 1997. Though, class/group background of elected representatives does not translate into the policy-making mandate. Pakistan has spent more years under military rule than politico-civilian leadership. Even when civilians were in power from 1988-1999, military bureaucracy directed the national security policy. The security policy.

Hence, national interest gets translated into emphasis on territorial security and economic development. Suppression of internal dissent and weakening of political institutions are the side effects. Policy makers and opinion leaders in Pakistan have invoked "national interest" rationale to justify all major decisions. ¹⁶ These horizontal concepts of national security and economic growth get concentrated vertically along the dominant groups/classes in the state and society of Pakistan. Dominant groups spell out the agenda of national interest and it would be naïve to expect that they would do so without being

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¹³ Though a higher percentage of professionals among elected representatives are an exception rather than a norm in Pakistani politics. A lot of these professionals were voted in due to popular support of Pakistan People's Party in 1970 elections.

Adnan Adil *et al.* "Key Players in Punjab Politics: The Pattern of leadership from 1970-97 and Implications for Women," (Islamabad: Savera), 2000.

¹⁵ According to popular newspaper reports, Benazir Bhutto was not allowed to inspect Pakistan's nuclear programme because the behind-the-scene policy and opinion makers in Pakistan considered her a "national risk". It illustrates the ineffectiveness of politico-civilian leadership in "national security" matters.

¹⁶ Pakistanis have heard national military and civilian leaders come in public and justify their policy decisions to serve supreme national interest. Ayub Khan transformed Pakistan into the most allied ally state of the United States for the sake of national interest in 1960s. He fought the 1965 war with India for the similar reason, patronized heavy industrialization and exacerbated the economic inequalities between haves and haves not. Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan alienated the majority Muslim population of the East Pakistan through socio-political and economic discrimination and finally Yahya Khan unleashed violence on Bengali separatist movement and committed heinous crimes against citizens. Pakistan was dismembered into half because of drumming of national interest oriented policies of its policy makers. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto repressed political opponents, trade unionists, progressive student bodies and internal insurgencies in Balochistan and the NWFP through both overt and covert use of violence in 1970s. He nationalized industry and banks for the sake of poor people. In retrospect, nationalization is considered to have contributed negatively to people's development. He purged the army and the bureaucracy to strengthen his own regime. Ziaul Haq dismembered the socio-political and institutional fabric of Pakistani society to promote state sponsored Islamization process in 1980s. Of course, in Ziaul Haq era, Islam and national interest were the two sides of the same coin and the coin was used to validate his illegal rule over Pakistan. The return to democracy decade of 1990s was embroiled in intense political bickering and corruption scandals of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif justified Pakistan nuclear tests in May 1998 again on the pretext of Pakistan's national interest. The present military government leadership is quite fond of (mis)using national interest banter. The decision of Musharraf government to extend support to the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan is again justified on national interest ground.

influenced by their vested interests. Investment in territorial security further empowers the military bureaucracy, emphasis on the suppression of internal dissent strengthens civilian bureaucracy and economic growth caters to the interests of dominant feudalindustrialist and professional classes.¹⁷

However, emphasis on territorial security does not play second fiddle to anything, not even to the objective of economic development. Quite obviously, the goals of defense expenditure and economic development are inherently contradictory. Military expenditure and interest payments¹⁸ accounted for 60% of total expenditure in 1990-91 and it went up to 71.5% in 1997-8.19 For the years 2001-2001, it again came down to 61.25%. 20 It is detrimental to economic development because it "buys virtually nothing by way of productive goods and services". According to Shahrukh Khan, Pakistan spent \$9.2 billion as the total budgeted cumulative military expenditure over the last decade and most of this expenditure is spent on military personnel, hence "the weapon systems are likely to be off budget". 21 It is substantiated by a Freedom House report claims that Pakistan spent \$6 billion over the last decade on weapon systems.²² There has been an annual real increase in military expenditure of 5.2% in Pakistan from 1957-1996.²³ It is more than annual GNP increase. Pakistan has frozen its military expenditure at Rs 131 billion in the last few years compared to India's sky-rocket increase in the defense

¹⁷ We are making a broad generalization just to point towards the contours of policy-making process. It will be a gross oversimplification to assume the process of determining national security/national interest as a static process. The nature of these groups and classes change and so does their share in the pie.

¹⁸ Pakistan currently has \$38 billion of foreign debt. Pakistani citizens do not know why various governments borrowed so much money and are still borrowing it. One obvious reason is that various governments have not been able to live within their means and borrowed to bridge the gap between the expenditure and revenue. Another oft-quoted reason is the endemic corruption that military and civilian bureaucracy and politicians have indulged themselves in. Another strong reasons is that a substantial amount of this borrowed money was spent on to pay for hidden defence expenditure such as purchasing weapon systems and funding of Pakistan's nuclear programme. No one knows the details, as the government has not shared Pakistan's debt history. When the same question was out to the Chairman of Debt Committee in a pre-budget seminar in 2001, the Chairman refused to entertain the question.

¹⁹ Shahrukh Rafi Khan, "Rationalizing Pakistan's Expenditure Pattern", *The News International*, May 23,

²⁰ Government of Pakistan, Federal Budget in Brief 2001-2002, (Islamabad: Finance Division), 2001.

²¹ Khan, ibid.

²² Shiraz Paracha, "Pakistan's defense deals during the last 10 years", The Freedom House, London. The report was circulated over email in late 1999.

23 Human Development Report in South Asia, 1997, ibid, p. 83.

budget. However, yet Pakistan's defense expenditure and interest payments are big enough to plunge the country in deep economic and human development crisis.

More than economic development, defense expenditure is highly detrimental to human development and security. Pakistan spends \$6066 per soldier and \$ 36 per student.²⁴ Pakistan's military expenditure was 393 more as percentage of education and health spending in 1985 and 129 more as percentage of education and health spending in 1990-91.25 For the year 2001-2002, the military expenditure is Rs 131 billion while the education and health spending is Rs 6502 and 2162 million.²⁶ Combines expenditure on education and health makes it roughly 0.66 of the military budget.

Within the thematic focus of human security, we will discuss four related sub-themes:²⁷

- 1. Livelihoods Security
- 2. Political Security
- 3. Environmental Security
- 4. Terrorism

The linkages between are these sub-themes are fairly self-evident.

1. Livelihoods Security

Livelihoods security of people is an intrinsic part of human security. Any discourse on economic security for people cannot but emphasize on making people secure from poverty, unemployment, economic exploitation, lack of opportunities to utilize their potential. We are going to examine some of those indicators of economic security of people now.

While poverty has increased considerably in Pakistan in the last decade and it has been verified by various sources including the government itself. In 1991, the estimated number of poor was 34 percent and now it has reached 40 percent of population. The

²⁴ Paracha, ibid.

²⁵ Human Development Report for South Asia 1997, ibid.

²⁶ Federal Budget in Brief 2001-2002, ibid.

²⁷ Fogia Sadiq Khan and Shahrukh Rafi Khan, "Human Security: Where Do we Stand?", Unpublished Concept Note for Sustainable Development Conference on Human Security, (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute), 2000.

total number of people living in poverty is 40 million, out of which 27 million live in extreme poverty. About 40 percent of country's population is without safe drinking water and nearly 84 percent of rural population is without sanitation facilities. Infant mortality rate has been high 88 children per 1000 births and life expectancy is 63 years. Unemployment has risen across all sectors as shown in table below:

Table. Unemployment rates by major industry division over time

Major Industry Divisions	1987-88	1992-93	1996-97
Agriculture, forestry,	1.2	1.7	3.1
hunting and fishing			
Manufacturing and mining	5.3	9.0	11.1
Electricity, gas and water	9.1	3.8	9.1
Construction	11.6	7.2	7.8
Wholesale & retail trade	3.5	2.8	4.1
Transport, storage and	9.1	7.9	8.4
communication			
Community, social &	5.4	9.9	10.4
personal services			
Others (financing,	8.1	10.3	5.4
insurance, real estate and			
business services and			
activities not adequately			
defined)			
Total	3.1	4.7	6.1

Source: Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Saba Gul Khattak and Sajid Kazmi, "Hazardous Home - Based Sub-Contracted Labour: A Study of Multi-tier Exploitation." SDPI monograph series, forthcoming.

Strings attached to the structural adjustment facility (SAF) loans introduced in 1987-88 by the international financial institutions had a detrimental impact on the poor and the

marginalized people. SAF loans emphasized on decreasing the budget deficit by cutting on government expenditure and increasing its revenue. Since the government cannot cut on defense expenditure due to its national security agenda and default on loan payments due to its commitments with international financial institutions, the proverbial axe fell on social sector development expenditure. In 1990-91, a quarter of government expenditure was spent on development; it fell to 15.8% in 1999-2000. The budget estimates for 2001-2001 has slightly risen to 17.3%. Shahrukh Khan has analyzed the impact of IFIs policies on the poor and labour. Public sector employment decreased from 35.3 to 28.7 %. There has been a major cut in subsidies from 4.1% in 1990-91 to 2.3% in 1999-2000, while almost half of these subsidies were provided for wheat and sugarcane. It has had a negative impact on the consumption patterns and nutritional needs of the poor. Indirect taxes are double than direct taxes in government's revenue estimates for 2001-2002. Indirect taxes hurt the poor much more than direct taxes. The prices of petroleum have increased manifold in the decade of 1990s and so have utility charges. Imposition of General Sales Tax as part of IFIs conditionalities led to a high inflation rate in 1990s and again had a bad impact on the poor. Real income in all income groups declined in this period. Lowest income group observed the highest decrease and the highest income group the lowest. It cannot but further increase the inequality between the lowest and highest income groups. Despite the ambitious Social Action Programme started by international donor agencies and the government to increase spending on social sector and mitigate the effects of structural adjustment programme, indicators for social sector development did not improve. ²⁹

Unemployment and poverty increased considerably in the decade of 1990s. The percentage of people living below the poverty line is estimate to have increased from 25% in mid-1980s to 39% by end 1990s in Pakistan. Unemployment, under-employment and "disguised unemployment" are some of the contributing factors to high ratios of poverty. In the rural areas, 13.3% of underemployment was recorded and 6.3% was

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²⁸ While, the labour is being pushed out of formal sector to informal sector and home based work due to contracting-out driven push of the globalization process.

²⁹ Shahrukh Rafi Khan, "Structural Adjustment, Labour and the Poor", *Do World Bank and IMF policies Work?* (Houndmills: MacMillan Press Ltd.), 1999

Khan, "Rationalizing Pakistan's Defense Expenditure Pattern" ibid.

registered in the urban areas. It is linked with the decline in the manufacturing sector due to the conditions imposed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and loose disciplinary action of banks. By mid 1990s, close to 4 thousand manufacturing units closed.

There are minimal safety nets for the poor and marginalized. The hungry, mal-nourished, unemployed, ill, shelter-less, land-less and destitute have access to little state protection. A number of people committed self-immolation in Pakistan in the past two years and almost all of them publicly claimed to have undertaken this mind-boggling form of protest due to extreme poverty.

2. Political Security

Civil and political liberties are closely linked to issues of economic growth, food security, provision of livelihoods and conservation of the environmental resource-base. Protection of the rights of citizens cannot be viewed in isolation from the larger development process. It is intrinsic to it. However, it is important to highlight the issue of sociopolitical security, particularly in the context of the vulnerable groups of society.

Equality of all citizens enshrined in the constitution or the ratification of international protocols does not translate into safety of citizens' civil and political rights. Citizens have to deal with the local power structures and state power structures on a day-to-day basis. Feudal structures dominate the *de facto* space and district administration controls the formal legalistic relationship with citizens. Citizen's social-political rights are not safeguarded on a number of counts:

The military government of Pervez Musharraf introduced devolution of power plan in 2001 to provide essential services to people at their "doorsteps." The devolved political structure is still going through its teething problems and its efficacy and long term sustainability is not beyond doubt.

A good number of *haris* family in rural Sindh in Pakistan end up working as bonded labour, a fact well-documented by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and other watch groups. *Hudood* Ordinance and consequently of languishing in jail for the rest of

ones life. *Hudood* Ordinances were passed during the Zia regime in early 1980s to curb adultery. However, women cannot approach the state's law enforcement agencies because they need to provide four male witnesses who have witnessed the actual act of rape. Since, it is impossible to provide witnesses, hence they can be booked for adultery under the *Hudood* Ordinances. Legislation of *Qanoon-e-Shahdat* (Law of Witnesses) suggests that one man, as a witness is equal to two women in economic matters.

Pakistan went through a phase of Islamization in 1980s championed by the military government. Women bore the brunt of it in both countries. However, the respective governments were not too serious in the implementation of strict interpretation of Islam. This attitude gave space to women's group to emerge, consolidate and campaign for women rights. It is obvious that military government's Islamization rhetoric centred around passing discriminatory legislation against women in Pakistan.

Often Christians are booked under the Blasphemy Law again passed in 1980s. Anyone who is proven to have committed blasphemy against Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him) can be sentenced to death under 295-C of Pakistan Penal Code. This is a law used to persecute minorities particularly Christians. The present military government tried to introduce a procedural change in the Blasphemy law in 2000 so that the likelihood of false registration of cases decreases but had to back out its decision after protests from religious parties. No one has been hanged to death in Pakistan till now. However, a few accused have been lynched to death after their acquittal. This law is hanging like a sword on minorities. Police and judiciary, particularly the lower judiciary is rotten to the core.

Though the issue of social-political security cannot be addressed effectively without transforming existing unjust and exploitative power structures, however discriminatory laws, which clearly target vulnerable citizen groups like the *Hudood* Ordinance, and Blasphemy Law. There are other laws under the Army Act, which contradict the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. And these laws can surely be changed if there is enough political will.

While the press is relatively free in Pakistan, journalists are harassed, jailed, and beaten up both by state and other powerful lobbies. The electronic media is in the government's control for the past 52 years. Pakistan Television and Pakistan Broadcasting are run by public money yet monopolized by every sitting government. These are the channels of communications that need to take up issues of public interest.

3. Environmental Security

All our resources are ultimately derived from nature. The environmental resource-base is often taken for granted and that itself is the big threat to the environment. Economic growth models and GDP ratios do not include the cost of environmental degradation. The social cost of environmental degradation is much higher than the private cost. It costs almost nothing for industries to emit pollutants in the air, while it drains societal resources if we take into account air quality, health cost, climate change costs etc. The property rights regime does not take into account the capital of environmental resource base or costs of degradation. The property rights regime accepts polluters' rights and gives no legal or economic protection to polutees and this is extensively documented in the environmental economics literature. This phenomenon is referred to as market failure or government (taxation) failure. Environmental goods are not priced, sold or protected.

The environment is generally regarded as a "luxury good". The argument goes like this: if one has enough to eat, only then one can think of something as fancy as clean air etc. This argument is applied both at the micro level of households and macro level of nation-states. However, the reality suggests something quite the contrary. The lack of environmental security is closely linked to poverty. Developing countries are essentially what are called "biomass-based subsistence economies". The rural poor depend on their local environments for their livelihoods whether it is fuel, grazing or fertilizers. Soil erosion, deforestation and unavailability of water are a *cause* of poverty. The urban poor are most vulnerable to unclean drinking water, lack of sanitation and sewage disposal, air pollution, hazardous work environment and bad health. The high population growth, poverty and environmental degradation mutually reinforce each other.

There is no legal cover for historical users of environmental resources in Pakistan. The centralized decision-making system is located far away from rural communities. Local communities are disenfranchised in decision-making and implementing processes. Local notables, in collaboration with the state machinery, exploit local environmental resources (for example forests in the Haraza district of the North-West Frontier Province) that are detrimental to the environmental resource base and the sustainability of livelihoods of local people. Industries excrete their waste to main rivers in Pakistan and enter food chain. There is no effective mechanism to stop it, though government and environmental NGOS are trying to introduce the self-monitoring to implement polluter- pay principle. The four-year long drought that just ended this year undermined peoples physical, livelihood and social well being tremendously. Balochistan and Thar regions were affected by drought. The rural poor in these areas lost their livestock. Livestock was the only livelihood most of them had. Water shortages hit both urban and rural areas all over the country.

4. Present Government's Response to Terrorist Acts and War on Afghanistan

They needed to embrace the opportunity for economic development (by accessing aid from the allies) at the cost of their rigid foreign policy. They took the leap. They preferred their economic objectives to strategic objectives. Now, in the changed world of 21st century and economically fragile Pakistan, economic dictates took precedence. If we analyze in the context of "national interest" theory, it is again going to benefit certain classes. However, it also seems that a discourse on human development and indebtedness of Pakistan's economy by civil society might have also played a role in shaping policy makers perspective other than government's analysis of its strategic needs. The paper see the present government's response as a radical shift away from Pakistan's traditional national security agenda, though it is not a shift away in Pakistan's policy of siding with the United States.

Human security and Civil Society

Mustapha Kamal Pasha has made an attempt to contextualize civil society along the matrixes of post-coloniality and expansion of capitalism in Pakistan. Civil society as we know of today is quite a contrast to the concept used by political philosopher in the 18th and 19th century. For them, advent of modern state was synonymous to "civil state". Now, we know of civil society that connects micro realities at the household level with the state.³⁰ It is a gray area and some of its shades are also part of state: political parties are part of civil society, however when elected, they form the government. Similarly academia in Pakistan is largely controlled by state. The University Grants Commission, Ministry of Education, controls public universities. Yet, academia is also part of civil society. Electronic media should have been part of the civil society, but government had controlled it. There are other shades of civil society that are more independent of state: ethnic nationalist groups, women and human rights groups, and the independent press. However, civil society does not exist in isolation from the state. State and civil society mutually constitute each other. It links to our earlier discussion about overdeveloped/under-developed nature of state. The over-growth of coercive arm of state undermines and stifles space for civil society.

For this paper, we focus on the dissenting role of civil society. There have always been the dissenting voices in Pakistan's chequered history. Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Mazhar Ali Khan and other progressive people suffered huge personal losses in order to put across their alternative viewpoint in 1950s and 1960s. Students and labour uprising jolted the foundations of Ayub Khan's military regime in late 1960s. Pathan and Baloch nationalists were victimized in early 1970s for pursuing their nationalist agenda. Pro-Islamic groups cobbled an alliance to oppose the Bhutto government in late 1970s. Political workers organized a national movement against dictatorship in early 1980s.

The discourse on security has mostly been monopolized by statist ideologies. Discussion of security translates into safeguarding the territorial integrity of Pakistan and preservation of Islamic values. The dissenting voices against Pakistan's foreign policy came from the members of Communist party and progressive writers in the early decades

³⁰ Pasha, ibid.

of Pakistan's history. Later, ethno-nationalist leaders opposed Pakistan's involvement in Afghan *Jihad* in 1980s. However, there has not been an alternative discourse on security in major sections of civil society. When Nawaz Sharif called a select group of newspaper editors in May 1998 to discuss whether or not Pakistan should test nuclear weapon, the answer was affirmative by consensus. Few editors of the newspapers actually went one step ahead and complained to government for not having tested soon enough after India's tests on 11th May 1998. This shows the level of congruity between the security ideology of Pakistani state and prominent leaders in printed media. It does also translate into virtual absence of any debate on human security, socio-political rights and human development in Urdu and regional language press. In terms of reach out, Urdu/regional languages press is read by over 90% of literate population of Pakistan. The jingoistic appeal of this popular media does not leave the room for an alternative discourse on security.

However, the English language press is progressive in terms of accommodating criticism of national security perspective and accommodative of people's right to development and freedoms. Overall, printed media came of its age in post-Zia era. When press censorship was lifted in late 1980s, the printed media never looked back³¹. Nawaz Sharif's government tried to brow beat the management of a major newspaper chain The *Jang* Group and an English language weekly the *Friday Times* in late 1990s but it failed to do so. The new military government did not even attempt to place censorship on printed media when general Musharraf took power in 1999. Most of critical debates on human security and human development take place in the pages of English language press in Pakistan. Its major precincts are a limited circulation capacity and lack of qualified journalists.

There is little talk on human security/human development issues on Pakistan's state controlled electronic media. There is much propaganda on Pakistani position on Kashmir's dispute in the electronic media and Urdu language press that now the governments have become hostage to their own propaganda. Indian media is not much

³¹ Despite the fact that there is a congruity of views between the state's politics on national security and media as pointed out earlier.

different from Pakistan. Governments of India and Pakistan cannot take risk of reaching a solution to Kashmir dispute that would be considered "unpatriotic" by the public opinion in their respective countries. They have indulged in self-fulfilling prophecy over media. Often they have to live by jingoist Frankenstein monster that they created. We are often not aware of the recorded history of organized resistance on national security issues since national security is treated as a sacred cow.

An alternative perspective on the issues of national security started becoming public in the post-Zia days. Academics (late Iqbal Ahmed, Pervaiz Hoodbhoy, A.H. Nayyar and others), ex-politicians (Mubashir Hasan), retired servicemen (Air Marshad Noor Khan and a few others), independent NGOs (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan-HRCP, Sustainable Development Policy Institute-SDPI, Pakistan Institute for Labour Education and Research-PILER and others) women and labour groups began to question the impossible – the national security issues. Pakistan-India Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD) was formed in 1994 to bring together the peace activists in India and Pakistan.

In that background, a small constituency for peace was born. The nuclear detonations by India and Pakistan brought alive their worst nightmare. Three new groups led the antinuclear resistance in Pakistan: Citizens Peace Committee (CPC) in Islamabad/Rawalpindi, Joint Action Committee (JAC) in Lahore and Action Committee Against Arms Race (ACAAR), Karachi. Baloch Students Federation staged protests in Quetta. These groups formed an umbrella national group-- the Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC).

Other than organizing demonstrations and seminars, these groups organized a conference on national security issues in June 1998, hosted trips of Hiroshima survivors, invited politicians for a dialogue, and commemorated the Hiroshima Day in 1998 to mark their opposition to nuclear bombs. The cycle of alternative dialogue culminated in a peace conference in Karachi in February 1999. The report of the conference is available.³²

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³² Peace for All, Pakistan Peace Coalition, 1999.

Alternative security paradigm has become public in Pakistan for the last one decade. It has led to a nascent peace campaign in the country. The focus has shifted from track II diplomacy to people to people dialogue between India and Pakistan. Indo-Pak Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy was the first institutionalized effort to create a forum for regular exchange of views on security issues in the Subcontinent. After the nuclear detonations by India and Pakistan, the budding peace campaign transformed into an antinuclear resistance.

The civil society discourse on human security challenged the mainstream notions of national security and linked it with human development. Lack of focus on human security was intrinsically linked to poor health, education, shelter, and employment conditions of people.

In the development paradigm, two distinct approaches surfaced. One pure developmentalist approach focused itself to "service delivery" aspect of development. About 10,000 non-governmental organizations were formed, mostly in rural areas to build schools, hospitals, roads, and water supply schemes, provide micro-credit and other facilities with the active involvement of community. They were politically conceived development interventions focused on rural poor. However, they were rather apolitical in terms of their functions. They did not talk about people's rights, their socio-political liberties, the socio-economic injustices between various tiers of society and classes. Another a much smaller group of non-governmental organizations appeared in mostly urban centers that focused on advocacy and/or developmental activities. Women rights, rights of minorities, labor rights, bonded & child labor, human rights, governance issues and decentralization of government were some of the issues tackled by these awarenessdevelopment public interest organizations. It broadened the concept of human development and linked it with human security. Shirkat Gah, Aurat Foundation, Christian Study Centre, Sungi Development Foundation, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Pakistan Institute for Labour Education and Research (PILER), Women Action Forum (WAF), Pattan Development Foundation and the Network for Consumer Protection (The Network) are the names of some of these rights oriented development organizations based in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi. Some of these large organizations have advocacy and development out-reach programmes in rural communities as well.

NGOs have made a meaningful difference in the lives of people in Bangladesh. BRAC and the Grameen Bank are a household names. Even in mid 1990s, these national NGOs had given 3.5 million loans and disbursed over a billion US dollars. The non-governmental sector in some ways replaced the governmental sector in Bangladesh in 1990s.³³ It resulted to the government's inability and inefficiency to deal with the growing problems of governance. The Rural Support Programmes (RSPs) in Pakistan have extended their network through the length and breath of country to provide social services to people but NGOs in Pakistan do not have similar outreach as of NGOs in Bangladesh. By corollary, one can assume that the government in Pakistan has a larger presence in social service delivery in Pakistan compared to Bangladesh.

Political parties are the most important pillars of civil society. Despite the fact that they made right kind of noises in their manifestos, the two mainstream political parties did not do much to promote human security and development. They were forced to focus on state security issues by a might military establishment that ran the foreign and defense policies of political governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Their attempts to normalize relationships with India have been one step forward and two steps backward story. Whenever political governments tried to normalize relationships, there was a backlash from the military. The contradictions in Nawaz Sharif's second term are evident from the fact that he adopted normalization of relationship with India as his election slogan and ended up attacking India in the Kargil conflict just before he was ousted by a military coup.

Obstacles to human security/development

In the case of Pakistan, religious extremism, authoritarian control of military bureaucracy and slow pace of noramlisation of relations with India due to the Kashmir conflict are obstacles in advancing human security/human development in Pakistan.

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³³ Abu Abdullah, *ibid*.

Indo-Pakistan military and political antagonism besieged the development agenda of Pakistan since its creation. There is nothing that has undermined people's development and rights so comprehensively as the lingering dispute over Kashmir. In the first half of 1960s, Pakistan was on path of sound economic growth (not human development). There was a significant increase in per capita income and 5.5% annual growth in GNP. Large-scale manufacturing was the hallmark of economic progress with 17% growth. All economic sectors grew at a much greater speed than targets given in the second five-year plan of 1960-65. However, all of this economic growth started to deteriorate in the aftermath of 1965 war. And Pakistan's economy could never stand on its feet again. Why did this happen?

Surely, Pakistan's economic growth was by no means equitable across regions or classes. Yet, it was a miraculous economic growth. Pakistan was quoted as a model in literature on economic growth in developing countries at that time. It was far ahead of Korea and others in Asia. Denial of political participation and suppression of an alternative view on security issues contributed to the Ayub government's quasi-military intervention in Kashmir and India responded to it by launching an all out war in 1965. The war ruined Pakistan's economy for decades to come. The national interest of Pakistan means security of borders and economic development. However, in the case of government's national security policy and commitment to Kashmir conflict, all other objectives of national interest were put aside. The same story was repeated in 1998 when Pakistan decided to test its nuclear weapon. A national security decision was made at the cost of already fragile economy of Pakistan. Nuclearization of the Sub-continent and particularly nuclearlization of Pakistan is directly related to five decades long Kashmir conflict. The latest episode of Kashmir conflict led the armed conflict in northern Kashmir heights of Kargil in 1999. A political government elected with an open admission to promote peace with India succumbed to the pressures of military establishment and got embroiled in military sponsored adventurism. Involvement in Kargil further eroded Pakistan's political, economic and human development. The Nawaz Sharif regime lost power in a coup.

³⁴ Omar Noman, "Military and Civil Rule", *The Political Economy of Pakistan*, (London: KPI Limited), 1988.

In the absence of Indo-Pak antagonism, Pakistan would have little or no rationale to keep six hundred thousand troops, a nuclear programme and one quarter of its annual expenditure on defence. There would also be little or no rationale to give military training to students in *madrassahs* (mosque schools) by right-wing religious parties. Kashmir conflict has not only ripped apart Pakistan's economic development in 1960s, sapped a lion's share of Pakistan's annual budget for over five decades but also directly contributed to the underdevelopment of human development, negligible resources for the social sector, strengthened military and civilian bureaucracy's hold over Pakistan's decision-making processes, contributed to denial of politic-civil liberties of people and rights of the poor, women and marginalized.

The Indo-Pak conflict has given space to a strong hawkish constituency to flourish in both countries. It has led to a mindset among policy makers and opinion makers in Pakistan that derives its raison d'etre from mutual animosity. The military, intelligence agencies, hawkish security opinion-makers have achieved a tremendous ascendance over policy-making process. The Indo-Pak dispute has directly contributed to the over-development of coercive powers of Pakistani state at the cost of underdevelopment of civil society and people's politic-economic rights.

There are other adverse spin-off effects of Kashmir dispute. It has led to an entrenched hostility between two countries. Pakistan encourages groups in Pakistan to fight with India forces. They mostly target the Indian security forces. However, they also target unsympathetic Kashmiri civilians. As result of their military uprising, the Indian forces have killed, injured and maimed tens of thousands of Kashmiris and raped Kashmiri women. Human security of Kashmiri population is being massively violated both by separatist militants and Indian security forces. It resonates with Pakistani security agencies military action in the East Paksitan in 1970 with Bengali being killed, injured and women being raped by security agencies.

Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies kill innocent civilians in bomb blasts on regular basis. A former Interior Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Moinuddin Haider, said in a TV interview that there are on average 100 bomb blasts in Pakistan every year. If divided over the 365 days in a year, on an average, there is a bomb blast every third or fourth day

in Pakistan. These bombs are placed in crowded places. Nothing can be more illustrative of how doctrines of national security *actually* undermine human security as these bomb blasts that have become a common feature in Pakistan.

The staggering defence expenditure is a major bar on Pakistan's resources. Though it fell as a percentage of GNP from 5.1% to 4.5% in the 1985-2001 period. It remained stagnant for Bangladesh at 1.3% of GNP. However, defence expenditure as a percentage of central government's expenditure increased for Bangladesh in the decade of 1980s and 1990s. It rose from 9.4% to 11.2%. These figures corroborate the analysis made by Naila Kabeer that army's direct and indirect influence grew in the Zia-ur-Rahman and Ershad's regime in Bangladesh in 1980s. The period expenditures consistently drain resources and take them away from human development. Whereas government's expenditure on health and education combined is close to 3% of GNP, a major portion of the government's budget is spent on defence. Debt servicing and defence used to constitute two/thirds of government expenditure in late 1990s in Pakistan. The expenditure priorities have changed a somewhat in 2000s but only marginally. Unless the government in Pakistan resolves its differences with India and irons tensions with Afghanistan, it will be difficult to cut back on the defence expenditure despite Pakistan being a nuclear power.

Other factors that are major hurdles to advancing human security/human development in Pakistan are the very nature of composition of post-colonial state. Big land-owners still dominate the political scene of Pakistan. Even when they are not in power, they have enough representation and contacts with the civilian and military bureaucracy not to threaten their interests. Three attempts at land reforms (1959, 1971, 1977) were not properly implemented due to the influence of big landowners. In Sindh, big land-owners still have bonded labour to work in their land. Successive government have not been able to do much about bonded labour. No government has been able to impose a substantial agricultural tax either.

³⁵ Human Development in South Asia 2003: The Employment Challenge. Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2003, pp. 192-3. Naila Kabeer, *ibid*.

Public officials who have been involved in policy formulation have been involved in predatory rent-seeking practices. The impersonal structure of bureaucracy is imposed on a society where personal relations still mean a lot. Police, judiciary, delivery of social services is not accessible to citizens. The state machinery is highly prone to the politics of patronage. Rich and well-connected people get things done. Due to weak institutional structure, public officials misuse their official powers to gain massive private gains. Stories of politicians, bureaucrats and military officials indulgence in corruption are but too common. This deprives common people of their rights to health, education, shelter, safe drinking water and a potential to lead good life. Resources and opportunities are taken away from the poor and monopolized by resourceful land-owners, industrialists, professionals, bureaucrats, military people and sensational journalists.

The way to reverse this trend would have been institutionalization of democracy to enable people to participate in decision-making processes and in turn in the processes of resource-redistribution. The record of democracy is too dismal. Whenever, democracy comes back after being derailed for years, the political culture is weaker and shallower. More than that, rich land-owners, industrialists, professionals and traders win elections whenever there is democracy in the country. They use political power to serve their personal or group interests at the cost of collective development. Lack of democracy has also deprived people of their fundamental political liberties. Poor, women, agricultural and un-unionized industrial labour and minorities have been hit the hardest. Present government's attempt to devolve power to the grassroots level is a welcome policy. However, it needs to be seen how effective would it prove to franchise people. According to a study conducted by SDPI, land-owners have dominated the local body elections in rural Pakistan. If this trend is widespread in other areas as well, it does not bode well for the empowerment of people at the grassroots level.³⁶

The Pakistan's establishment continuous expenditure on defense and army, the habit of living beyond means and borrowing heavily and lowest possible priority on health, education and social development and lack of political will to ensure socio-economic

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³⁶ Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Aasim Sajjad Akhtar and Foqia Sadiq Khan, Khan, "Investigating the Importance of Landed Power and other Determinants of Local Body Election Outcomes," in ed. M. Waseem, *Electoral Reforms* (Islamabad: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), 2002.

justice between various classes and absence of structural reforms such as land reforms and civil service reforms are the major obstacles to human development and human security.

Institutions/Organizations on Human Security

The prominent peace groups in Pakistan are the Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD) and Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC). PIPFPD has chapters in major cities and also has corresponding chapters in India. It is a truly Sub-continental peace group. It was established in 1995 in India and meets every year in India and Pakistan by taking turns. Retired military officers, academics, human right activists, trade unionists, journalists and progressive writers/intellectuals are its members. Its active membership is not more than five hundred. PIPFDP meets every month to discuss peace related topics. Though, they are not very regular in their meetings.

Pakistan Peace Coalition is an umbrella organization of various peace groups that were formed in Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore after Pakistan's nuclear testing. It does not have an affiliated partner in India, though it actively interacts with all major peace groups in India through meetings, workshops and email/ internet. Like PIPFPD, people of progressive background are its members. Its membership is also about the same as PIPFDP. Both peace forums have many joint members as well. PPC's chapters meet to prepare for a significant event. They regularly commemorate the anniversaries of Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests and Hiroshima Day to spread awareness against nuclear weapons. The typical programme on such anniversaries is to hold a protest demonstration at a public place in the respective city with anti-nuclear play-cards and banners. On Hiroshima Day, various chapters also try to show some movie to show the destructive capability of nuclear weapons.

Both these peace groups also get activated when foreign peace activists visit the town. They have hosted functions to introduce the ideas of Japanese, Indian and European peace activists in various cities.

The nature of these groups is symbolic rather than real. They are a very tiny minority of the population of Pakistan. Their most common way to operate is to organize seminars and workshops and talks. Though, rich in content, such events have outlived their utility in terms of disseminating message of peace. Mostly, such events preach to the converted and do not make much difference. Similarly, few protests in a year are also more symbolic than an effort to mobilize people for peace. The purpose of these small protests is to register the dissent of peace activists against national security and nuclearization policies. Such protests get covered in printed media (mostly English-language printed media), yet they do not reach out to common people.

However, due to their well-connected educated background, this tiny minority is not voiceless. Its voice is marginalized but cannot be silenced. Articles in the English language press by peace activists has been their only way to communicate to others. Despite the very limited outreach of English press, it is read by policy-makers and is quite influential in that sense. Initially, when a discourse on peace and human security was initiated in early 1990s, the members of establishment and majority of media that is sympathetic to national security ideology of the establishment openly dubbed writers of such articles "traitors". They were harassed by intelligence agencies, beaten up by religious groups who have quite conservative and jingoistic views on national security. Yet, they were heard whether they were liked or not. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in his speech on national television on 28th May 1998 recognized the dissenting voice of this small minority while announcing Pakistan's nuclear tests. Chief of Army Staff, Jehangir Karamat made statements in newspapers that talked about the cost of defence programme for social development. The present military government seems quit cognizant of alternative views on human development. The jargon of Pakistan's policy makers and military leadership on human development has changed tremendously. One can rightly acknowledge the role of these tiny peace groups in bringing a transformation in the language of policy-makers.

However, the policies of government will only change when the message of peace is spread to common people and they get committed to mobilize public action for peace. PPC got itself activated again to condemn terrorism and war in Afghanistan. It was able

to mobilize small community based groups, trade union members and people living in *katchi abadis* (shanty towns) to the extent that about five thousand people from all over country demonstrated for peace in Rawalpindi in November 2001. Such large mobilization franchize peace groups in Pakistan. They need to make linkages between lack of peace and people's economic and human development to non-coverted people to make a dent in the policy making process.

Right now, Kashmir dispute is the biggest worry of peace groups in Pakistan. The present military government seems quite keen to rid the society of religious extremism that tore apart Pakistan's social fabric in the aftermath of Afghan *Jehad* in 1980s. However, they are worried that government will tolerate these forces to continue its covert military support in Kashmir. Unless, Indian government shows willingness to talk about solution of the Kashmir dispute (no matter what the solution will be), human security and human development will continue to suffer because of government's national security policy on Kashmir.

Other than peace groups, there are people to people exchanges between Indians and Pakistanis. Retired army officers, journalists, retired bureaucrats and academics have been involved in Track II diplomacy in 1990s. There has been an active exchange between students supported by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Sri Lanka. Students from SAARC countries and China meet twice a year for Summer and Winter workshops. Now in the post détente period, artists, singers, sports people, children and even medical patients are being exchanged regularly between India and Pakistan. It needs to be seen for how long this détente last if meaningful progress was not made on "core" issues. The détente has ushered in post-September 11 period due to the need of both countries to concentrate on religious extremism.

There is an active collaboration between Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India and Pakistan. Federation of Indian Chambers and Industry (FICCI) has been engaged on issues of mutual cooperation with Pakistani business community since 1995. There is a SAARC Chamber of Commerce with its headquarters in Islamabad. It is promoting regional cooperation between its members. As a result of its cooperation, India and Pakistan have formed their own joint "India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and

Industry" (IPCCI) in Lahore in 1999 during Prime Minister Vajpayee's trip to Lahore. It met for the second time in May 2001 in Islamabad. The objective of IPCCI is to "accelerate the trade, investment and technical ties between India and Pakistan". ³⁷

Conclusion

National security is considered synonymous to territorial security. Large-scale industrialization and increase in per capita income are tipped as the panacea of economic development. However, lack of social homogeneity and equitable distribution of resources triggered massive problems of internal security. Post-colonial states used their monopoly over the means of coercion to suppress dissent to pursue the mega-agenda of state formation.

Human security is people's security to get opportunities to get education, health, shelter, employment, food, clean environment and socio-political freedoms and rights and freedoms. Freedoms such as freedom of political participation in policy-making processes, freedom from suppression, freedom from persecution and freedom of speech, association, and above all freedom to live a healthy life both materially and mentally.

As such, human security is not the priority area for policy makers anywhere in the world and not certainly in post-colonial states of South Asia. Pakistan is a national security state. Everything else, even economic development, is subjected to a secondary position compared to national security agenda of state. Military and civilian bureaucracy dominates the decision—making process along with the congruence of interests of landowning and industrialist class. Professional class, small traders, urban bourgeoisie are also able to safeguard their interests in the decision-making process. Voices of the poor and marginalized groups are not heard. That is why Pakistan ranks so low on all human development indicators. Though, the present military government's decision to side with the US in its war against "terrorism" mark both change and continuity in Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan has always sided with the US whenever the latter desired so.

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³⁷ _____ "Report on Second Meeting of India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry" formulated by Federation of Indian Chambers and Commerce Industry, 2001.

Hence, the present decision is a continuity of military government's decision. However, it is major change in Pakistan's immediate policy in Afghanistan and religious extremism. In order to ensure human security and human development, a meaningful political process is needed to be institutionalized where the common people are given an opportunity to influence policy- making process. It can happen if awareness on human security issues is disseminated to the majority of people in Pakistan. International community can do so by supporting peace group to launch alternative electronic and print media, encourage dialogue among various opinion-makers in India and Pakistan particularly politicians and students.

Peace groups in South Asia need to try pressurize the governments of India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes including Kashmir. There is no short cut to peace in South Asia and no end to militarism, extremism, huge national armies, conventional and nuclear weapons unless Indo-Pak disputes are not resolved through peaceful means. Bangladesh is not involved in protracted international conflicts like Pakistan, yet the principle of peaceful resolution of issues applies equally. Lack of Bangladesh's preoccupation with military disputes explains its relatively better socio-economic development. Progressive movements need to be strengthened. There are campaigns for housing rights of people who are living in shanty towns, labour rights, women rights, minority rights. There are progressive community-based organization all over Pakistan. All of these movements need to be coordinated and mobilized for the issues of human security and people's rights. Unless that happens, the constituency for human security and peace will remain limited to a tiny urban educated minority. Similarly, progressive movements need to be supported in Bangladesh.

The theoretical section of paper discusses the influence of dominant groups and classes in the process of policy formulation. Human security/human development is not dished out to people on a silver platter. It is one thing to state that people have inalienable rights to security and development and it is quite another thing to ensure such rights and freedoms. The only way by which common people, the poor and the marginalized groups' voices can seek human security, if the process of political participation is made consistent, widespread and meaningful in Pakistan. Democracy is not only a way of political

participation, if effectively run, it is also a way to include people's voices in policy formulation and resource re-distribution.

Decentralization, factional politics, discriminatory legislation against women are the issues that concern human security debates in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Both countries went through extensive structural adjustment (SA) programmes in 1990s and people bore the brunt of poverty and unemployment. Women were particularly affected by SA policies. There is a need to form a joint platform to study, research and campaign against SA policies that undermine human security.

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